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This paper is premised on the concept of political accountability 
which aims to hold accountable government for its action and or 
omission. Political accountability encompasses a number of 
mechanisms such as the judiciary and the ombudsman. Courts 
have been instrumental in enforcing the realisation of the right to 
access to adequate housing in South Africa. This paper argues, 
however, that the judiciary is not the only enforcing avenue 
because other mechanisms of political accountability may also 
contribute to the realisation of the right to housing. The paper, 
therefore, explores the extent of the Public Protector's 
contribution to the realisation of the right to access to adequate 
housing. The paper then argues that it is through its functions 
that the Public Protector exercises its accounting role in the 
realisation of the right to access to adequate housing. The paper, 
however, cautions that the Public Protector is not an alternative 
dispute resolution institution parallel to courts. But that the Public 
Protector complements the role played by courts by offering 
another medium through which such right may be realised. 
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1 Introduction 
The realisation of the right to access to adequate housing (the right to 
housing)1 is replete in the literature, with the role played by the judiciary in 
holding government accountable. It is undeniable that the judiciary has 
played a significant and pivotal role in the realisation of the right to housing 
by laying down general principles for the adjudication of the right to housing, 
which is noticeable in many socio-economic rights cases.2 It is prudent at 
this junction to state that one should not conflate judicial accountability with 
judicial enforcement. These two terms should be placed in the whole context 
of political accountability. Judicial enforcement triggers the judicial 
accountability of those against whom judgment is passed. It is not the 
judiciary that accounts, but the judiciary that holds accountable public 
officials. The judiciary champions the development of a judicial approach to 
adjudicating and thereby enforces the right to housing. However, as argued 
elsewhere,3 the judiciary has imposed a self-limitation by deferring the 
enforcement of the realisation of the right to housing to other spheres of 
government. By deferring to other branches of government to decide on 
issues, courts feel they might avoid step into the terrain of other branches 
of government, but they then fail in their transformative duty to guarantee 
judicial and constitutional accountability.4 It is undeniable that this 
deferential approach to socio-economic rights adjudication in general is 
rooted in the doctrine of the separation of powers. The courts view 
themselves as being constrained in their enforcement role by the separation 
of powers.5 
                                            
* Carlos Joel Tchawouo Mbiada. LLM LLD (North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 
South Africa). Law Researcher, Labour Appeal Court. Email: cmbiada@gmail.com. 
1 This paper is confined to housing, initially, because my whole thesis (entitled 
Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability in the Realisation of the Right to 
Housing in South Africa) from which this paper is extracted, dealt with the realisation 
of this right. The powers of the Public Protector are thereafter examined in the light of 
the right to housing.  
2 See for instance, in Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC), which lays down the principles for the adjudication of socio-
economic rights; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 
BCLR 1169 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 
1033 (CC). 
3 For a discussion on judicial limits in realising the right to housing, see Brand 2011 Stell 
L Rev 614-638; Pillay 2002 ESR Review 16-18 and Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening 
the Role of Political Accountability 195-199, 207-208 and all the authors cited therein. 
4  Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 200.  
5  See De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law 687. The paper later deals with the 
question whether the separation of powers extends to the Public Protector.  
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Regardless of the courts' deferential approach, this paper argues that by 
focusing exclusively on the judiciary's role in enforcing the realisation of the 
right to housing, other mechanisms of political accountability that also play 
a part in the realisation of the right to housing have either been ignored or 
dealt with in isolation and/or in a piecemeal fashion. Accountability suggests 
the obligation of individuals to provide information about and to justify their 
action to others, along with the imposition of sanctions for a failure to 
comply.6 Indeed, accountability is the cornerstone upon which the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) is built. 
Accountability is the pillar that drives the whole new constitutional 
dispensation. To this effect section 1(d) provides that the Republic of South 
Africa is a sovereign, democratic state founded inter alia on universal adult 
suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party 
system of democratic government, the purpose of which is to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. All of these values entrench 
a culture of justification and explanation of one's action.7  
Political accountability, which encompasses the founding values and 
principles of the Constitution, is supported by the following mechanisms: 
elections, the judiciary, the ombudsman, decentralisation, public 
participation, constitutional limitations, information and transparency.8 All of 
these mechanisms ensure in one way or another that a person has to 
account for his/her actions. Put differently, political accountability entails that 
a person justifies his or her action. It is within this context that this paper 
critically investigates the extent to which the South African Public Protector, 
as a mechanism of political accountability, ensures the realisation of the 
right to housing. The requirement for the establishment of the office of an 
ombudsman is to improve the performance of public administration in order 
to enhance government's accountability to the public.9 
                                            
6 See Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 26-30. Also 
see Davis 2012 PER/PELJ 1-14.  
7  As Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32 puts it, the Constitution promotes "a culture of justification 
- a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the 
leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence 
of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new order must 
be a community built on persuasion, not coercion". The principle of accountability is 
found in some sections of the Constitution eg s 32, right to access to information; s 
33, right to just administrative action and more importantly, s 195(1)(e)-(g) in relation 
among other things to the basic values and principle governing public administration 
and accountability.  
8  Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 21.  
9  Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 68. 
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It is now fashionable for many countries in the world to have a 
constitutionally established ombudsman as a mechanism to enforce 
accountability by checking and monitoring public administration in the 
exercise of its duties.10 South Africa is no exception to this new trend. The 
Constitution has established some institutions in its Chapter 911 with the 
primary objective of supporting and strengthening democracy.12 Of 
relevance is the role of the Public Protector, which is examined in this 
paper.13 Although the scope of their respective mandates differs, these 
institutions have the general mandate to check on government.14 
This article is divided into two parts: The first part provides a brief account 
of the ombudsman worldwide and the challenges ombudsmen face. The 
second part critically analyses, in the light of the Public Protector's reports, 
how it holds the government accountable. 
2 The exercise of the accounting functions of the Public 
Protector in the realisation of the right to housing 
In order to understand how the Public Protector holds the government 
accountable, it may be helpful to describe the origin of the institution as it 
has evolved over time and been shaped into its modern form. 
2.1 A brief account of the origin and evolution of the ombudsman 
Despite the choice of the title "Public Protector" in the Constitution, this 
institution falls into the general category of the ombudsman. It follows, 
therefore, that the evolution of the role of the ombudsman is of relevance to 
that of the Public Protector from which it is derived. The origin and evolution 
of the role of the Public Protector should be located within that of the 
ombudsman. The ombudsman, in its "classical" form, has its roots in the 
office of justitie ombudsman (ombudsman for justice) created in Sweden in 
1809. Before this date, there was a kind of ombudsman appointed by King 
                                            
10  Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 228. Countries 
such as Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and New Zealand have all established 
ombudsmen with the powers to investigate maladministration.  
11 These institutions are: the Public Protector, the SAHRC, the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor-General and the 
Electoral Commission. 
12 Section 181(1) of the Constitution. 
13 For an examination of the role played by the South African Human Rights 
Commission, see Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 
229-238.  
14 Murray 2000 PER/PELJ 1-26.  
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Charles XII. After the military defeat to Russia in 1709, the Swedish king 
fled to Turkey for some years. As a result of the absence of the king, the 
administration of the country deteriorated.15  
In 1713, the king appointed an official to monitor the conduct of the Swedish 
administration and the judiciary and named the official Justitiekanslern 
(chancellor of justice). The Justitiekanslern was empowered to initiate legal 
proceedings against anyone who violated the law in the exercise of his/her 
functions.16 When the then king was deposed in 1809, the new Constitution 
divided the powers between the crown and the parliament, giving parliament 
some powers to check on the exercise of the executive power. The 1809 
Constitution included the office of the justitie ombudsman, an official 
appointed by parliament with the authority to supervise the public 
administration and the judiciary and to prosecute those who failed to carry 
out their duties. With the evolution of the institution, its function changed 
from being a purely legislative monitor to a public complaints-driven 
process.17 
It took more than a century from the inception of the office of the 
ombudsman in the Swedish Constitution of 1809 to expand beyond 
Sweden.18 The institution spread throughout Scandinavia in the early to mid-
twentieth century. Finland became the second Scandinavian country to 
establish its ombudsman, which was empowered to investigate complaints 
of official misconduct, military and prison complaints.19 The third country to 
set up the office of an ombudsman was Norway, which appointed a military 
ombudsman in 1952, followed by a general ombudsman in 1962. Denmark 
followed suit in 1955. The establishment of the office started to proliferate 
in the 1960s with the extensive spread of government bureaucracy in many 
nations. The model of the ombudsmen in Denmark and Norway, who does 
not have the powers to investigate the judiciary, was copied by other 
countries.20 New Zealand established an ombudsman based on the Danish 
                                            
15  See Jane "Ombudsman in Denmark and Norway" 145. 
16 See Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of Political Accountability 68-70 and 
the authors cited therein: Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International 
Human Rights System 5; Jane "Ombudsman in Denmark and Norway" 145; 
Wieslander Parliamentary Ombudsman 11-14; and Howard Organizational 
Ombudsman 3-4. 
17 Wieslander Parliamentary Ombudsman 17. 
18 Howard Organizational Ombudsman 4-7. 
19 Howard Organizational Ombudsman 4. 
20  Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 2.  
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format in 1962, followed by a long wave of the creation of new offices in 
other countries around the world.21 
As it stands, the establishment of the ombudsman in many developing 
Commonwealth countries has been instrumental in the establishment of the 
institution internationally, beyond Scandinavia.22 Since its inception, the role 
of the ombudsman has been to monitor and regulate the administrative 
activities of the executive branch of government. The ombudsman is a 
complaint-handling mechanism tasked with improving the accountability of 
government. The ombudsman serves as a vertical and horizontal 
accountability mechanism by receiving complaints from the people against 
the government, thereby serving as a check on government activities.23 The 
ombudsman is therefore, an instrument of democratic accountability 
between individuals and the administration of the state.24 Despite its origin, 
the ombudsman has evolved so that it now incorporate a number of 
activities such as the following: the human rights ombudsman assumes the 
protection of human rights (the South African Human Rights Commission 
falls under this category); the classical ombudsman deals with 
maladministration in the public sector; and other ombudsmen deal with a 
range of services (such as anti-corruption, leadership code enforcement 
and/or environmental protection functions).25 As stated above, the focus of 
this paper is on the office of the Public Protector, which falls within the office 
of the classical ombudsman.26 
Concerning the Public Protector, its predecessors were the Advocate-
General and the Office of the Ombudsman. Both the Advocate-General and 
the Office of the Ombudsman had the power under the Ombudsman Act27 
                                            
21 See in general Reif "Introduction" xxiv and Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and 
the International Human Rights System 6-7.  
22 Ayeni "The Ombudsman around the World" 5. 
23  Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 17-
18. Vertical accountability, also known as traditional accountability, refers to instances 
where political leaders are held accountable for their actions through periodic 
elections. Also falling under this category are the constitutional limitations designed to 
hold accountable spheres of government. Horizontal accountability refers to internal 
procedures set by professional or institutional bodies to monitor the work of public 
officials. In this case, civil servants are accountable to political leaders through 
standards set by various institutions. The ombudsman, decentralisation, public 
participation, information and transparency fall under this category. See Goetz and 
Jekins Reinventing Accountability 15. Tchawouo Mbiada Strengthening the Role of 
Political Accountability 27-30. 
24 Owen "The Ombudsman: Essential Elements" 51.  
25 Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 2. 
26  For an overview of the various ombudsmen, see Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance 
and the International Human Rights System 9-10, 20-23.  
27  Ombudsman Act 118 of 1979. 
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to investigate reports of maladministration, but not to take remedial action 
directly. Their remedial powers were expressly limited only to referring 
findings to other institutions for remedial action.28 
Notwithstanding the above, the role of the ombudsman is to uphold 
government accountability. However, one of the concerns about the 
capacity of the ombudsman to discharge its mandate is the issue of its 
independence. To this end, it is argued that the independence and 
impartiality of the ombudsman is a prerequisite for its effectiveness.29 In 
order to discharge its functions, the ombudsman must be independent, 
impartial, fair and confidential.30 However, the issue of the ombudsman's 
independence in the South African context does not arise. This is because 
the Constitution secures the independence of the Public Protector through 
its establishment and appointment, removal from office and allocation of 
budgets and powers. 
The Public Protector is established by section 181(a) of the Constitution. 
The supreme law of the country that governs the conduct and organisation 
of the nation, therefore, creates the Public Protector. Its independence 
derives from the fact that the Constitution creates it. This is why the 
Constitution in unambiguous terms provides that the Public Protector is 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and it must 
be impartial and must exercise its powers and perform its functions without 
fear, favour or prejudice.31 Moreover, in terms of section 181(3) of the 
Constitution, organs of state are enjoined through legislative and other 
measures to assist and protect the Public Protector so as to ensure its 
independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness. 
Since a motion to amend the constitutional provision establishing the Public 
Protector requires an unlikely supporting vote of at least two-thirds in the 
National Assembly and a supporting vote of at least six members of the 
National Council of Provinces, it is unlikely that the independence of the 
Public Protector will be restricted. In any event, the more difficult it is to 
change the legal foundation of the Public Protector's office, the more likely 
                                            
28  South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd v Democratic Alliance 2015 4 All SA 
719 (SCA) (SABC v DA) para 31.  
29 Matshekga 2002 AHRLJ 70. Although referring to the human rights ombudsman, 
Matshekga's statement is also relevant to the Public Protector, which is a variant of 
the ombudsman. 
30 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403; Johnson "Ombudsman – 
Essential Elements" 786-787.  
31  Section 181(2) of the Constitution.  
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it is that the tenure of the office will be secured.32 Security of tenure creates 
stability and increases public confidence in whoever fills the office of the 
Public Protector. Besides the independence of the ombudsman arising from 
the constitutional guarantees, such independence also arises from manner 
of the appointment. 
In terms of section 193 of the Constitution, the President on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly appoints the Public Protector. 
The National Assembly makes a recommendation from persons nominated 
by a committee proportionally composed of members of all parties 
represented in the National Assembly. The nomination must be approved 
by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the 
members of the Assembly. This ensures that the candidate is a person who 
has wide respect among the different political parties represented in the 
legislature.33 It is argued, however, that the appointment process is flawed 
because of the composition of the ad hoc selection committee and the 
interview process.34 In respect of the composition of the panel, Bazana 
argues that a committee made up of politicians representing their various 
party and obviously their interests compromises the professional ethics of 
recruitment and selection.35 Regarding the interview process, he argues 
that a mere interview is inadequate to identify behavioural characteristics 
like integrity, honesty and reliability, which are crucial to the integrity of the 
office. He suggests the use of a more competency-based assessment 
selection method. In his view, a proper job analysis would provide a more 
specific and detailed account of these key behavioural competencies. 
Competency-based assessment relates directly to the job instead of 
assessing broader behavioural characteristics and scrutinising past events 
that are not related to the job. He further suggests that Parliament should 
use scientific recruitment methods by engaging recruitment professionals to 
manage the recruitment process. 
Regardless of this concern, the existing selection and recruitment process 
has been in place since the inception of democracy in South Africa. The 
                                            
32 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403; Johnson "Ombudsman – 
Essential Elements" 404.  
33 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403; Johnson "Ombudsman – 
Essential Elements" 404.  
34  Bazana 2017 https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-31-south-africa-should-use-a-more-
scientific-approach-to-appoint-its-public-protector.  
35  He raises concerns about the recent interviews conducted by the ad hoc committee. 
He expresses the opinion that they were disrespectful and demeaning of some 
candidates' characters and professional statures. Some were subjected to 
unwarranted personal attacks and some were subjected to inquisitions about their 
ideological positions with no relevance to the requirements of the job. 
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former Public Protectors have upheld the independence of the institution. 
The outgoing Public Protector Adv Thuli Madonsela's integrity and courage 
during her term of office bear testimony to the fact that notwithstanding the 
concerns raised about the appointment process, maintaining the 
independence of the Public Protector is a matter that depends chiefly on the 
characteristics of each appointee. It is therefore incumbent on the appointed 
Public Protector to prove that he/she is capable of maintaining the 
independence of the office. 
The independence of the Public Protector is also secured through 
constitutional provisions regarding its removal from office and sufficient 
allocation of budget. Concerning the removal from office, in terms of section 
194 of the Constitution the Public Protector may be removed from office only 
on account of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, after a finding to that 
effect by a committee of the National Assembly and the adoption by the 
National Assembly of a resolution calling for its removal from office. This 
resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal of the Public 
Protector from office must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two-
thirds of the members of the National Assembly.36 Once the resolution is 
adopted, the President must remove the Public Protector from office. The 
lengthy process and the high threshold set for the removal of the Public 
Protector37 consolidates its independence. The Public Protector cannot be 
removed for political reasons or because the results of investigations 
implicate those in power.38 
Another significant factor in the independence of the Public Protector is the 
allocation of the budget. It is common cause that financial autonomy plays 
a significant role in the efficiency of any institution in that without adequate 
resources it will be unable to carry out its activities.39 The Public Protector 
remains predominantly dependent on the legislature for the allocation of 
funds. It is argued in this respect that an inadequately funded office will not 
be able to perform the duties required by law and will thus lack 
independence.40 The Public Protector spends the funds allocated to the 
office and accounts directly to the legislature.41 This means that it has no 
                                            
36  Section 194(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
37  SABC v DA para 30.  
38 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403; Johnson "Ombudsman – 
Essential Elements" 405. 
39 Matshekga 2002 AHRLJ 84. 
40 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403; Johnson "Ombudsman – 
Essential Elements" 405. 
41  Section 181(5) of the Constitution.  
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control to decide on the allocation of its budget as Parliament determines 
and allocates its budget. 
The tendency is for Parliament to reduce the budget in order to fund what 
are perceived as being more urgent needs, such as the provision of housing 
and health-care services. When this happens, the Public Protector struggles 
to achieve its objectives. Recently, the Public Protector, while interacting 
with Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University students, expressed concern 
over her office's lack of sufficient funding. Similarly, while presenting her 
annual report to the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional 
Services, she reiterated her call for more funding proportional to the 
workload.42 One can infer that with a reduced budget, the Public Protector 
will not be able to carry out all its activities, thus reducing its effectiveness. 
The provision of inadequate resources does not help in establishing and 
maintaining the office of the Public Protector as an effective, independent 
and impartial institution. Under financial constraints it may unduly defer to 
political organs in the quest to obtain additional funds and thereby 
compromise its integrity and independence. 
Concerning the powers and functions of the Public Protector, it is argued 
that another way in which the ombudsman manifests its independence is 
through its powers to freely investigate complaints and issue findings and 
recommendations without interference.43 In South Africa, however, the 
functions of the Public Protector are found to go beyond those of the 
ombudsman in other jurisdictions.44 In the Mail & Guardian case the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that the Public Protector is not a 
passive adjudicator between citizens and the state, relying upon evidence 
that is placed before it before acting, but that its mandate is an investigatory 
one, requiring pro-action in appropriate circumstances.45 This signifies that 
the office of the Public Protector is given extensive powers in carrying out 
its functions. It is pro-active in discharging its investigative functions such 
                                            
42 Public Protector 2014 http://www.gov.za/public-protector-thuli-madonsela-calls-funding-
proportional-workload. The new Public Protector, Adv Busisiwe Mkhwebane recently 
pleaded with the Parliament's Justice Committee for an increase of her budget in order that 
she may discharge her work efficiently. See Gqirana 2017 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-need-r1bn-to-do-our-job-public-
protector-20170330. 
43 Gottehrer and Hostina "Classical Ombudsman Model" 403, 404; Johnson 
"Ombudsman – Essential Elements" 786. 
44  The Public Protector v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2011 4 SA (SCA) (Mail & Guardian) para 
9. Also see SABC v DA para 43.  
45  Mail & Guardian para 9.  
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as entering premises, requesting written submissions, and interviewing 
parties to a dispute. These powers and functions are dealt with below. 
2.2 The effect of recommendations of the office of the Public 
Protector 
While the ombudsman does not have the power to make decisions which 
are binding on the administration, it makes recommendations that are 
complied with on a voluntary basis and through the mercy of other 
governmental structures. If they choose to ignore them, the whole purpose 
for which it is established would have little effect.46 This was the case in 
South Africa when there were divided views on whether the findings and 
remedial actions of the Public Protector were binding. The debate was 
brought to court and it was left to the judiciary to clarify the authority of the 
remedial actions of the Public Protector. 
A case that warrants examination on this issue arises out of the failure by 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to implement the Public 
Protector's remedial action issued in Report No 23 of 2013/2014 (dealing 
with the investigation into allegations of maladministration, abuse of power 
and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the SABC). After 
investigation, the Public Protector directed in her report that the SABC board 
takes disciplinary action against Motsoeneng for his dishonesty relating to 
the misrepresentation of his qualifications, abuse of power and improper 
conduct in appointments and salary increases of Motsweni, and for his role 
in purging senior staff members. Instead of implementing the remedial 
action of the Public Protector, the SABC Board appointed Mr Motsoeneng 
permanently to the position of Chief Operations Officer, in which he had 
been acting. This prompted the Democratic Alliance (DA) to apply for the 
setting aside of the appointment.47 
The Public Protector then filed an affidavit in which she requested the court 
to assess whether her report on the matter was legally valid, binding and 
enforceable; and to refrain from pronouncing on the correctness of her 
findings or the remedial action contained in the report. Rejecting the Public 
Protector's contention that the findings and the remedial action of the Public 
Protector were binding and enforceable unless properly and successfully 
reviewed, the court held that because the Public Protector is modelled on 
                                            
46 Reif Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 18.  
47  The case is reported as Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Limited 2015 1 SA 551 (WCC) (DA v SABC).  
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the institution of the ombudsman, her findings and remedial actions are not 
binding or enforceable.48  
Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision that disciplinary proceedings be 
brought against Mr Motsoeneng, the SABC appealed to the SCA. For the 
present purpose, the decision of the SCA is limited to its finding in relation 
to the extent of the remedial action of the Public Protector. Distancing itself 
from the finding of the High Court, the SCA in SABC v DA made a crucial 
finding. The court took the view that in holding that the Public Protector's 
findings were not binding and enforceable the court a quo was comparing 
the powers of the Public Protector to that of a court. It found that it was 
unsound and inaccurate to do that because "the phrase 'binding and 
enforceable' is terminologically inapt and in this context, conduces to 
confusion".49 Relying on the decision in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City 
of Cape Town50 to the effect that an administrative decision stands until set 
aside on review, the SCA held that the principle also finds application to the 
findings of the Public Protector. According to the court, because of the 
unique position that the Public Protector occupies in the Constitution, that 
principle must apply "with at least equal or perhaps even greater force to 
the decisions finally arrived at by that institution".51 This signifies that without 
a review application to set aside the remedial action of the Public Protector, 
the official or the organ of state against whom the remedial action is issued 
is obliged to implement these findings and remedial measures. In other 
words, the Public Protector's findings must not be overlooked and should 
be implemented until reviewed and set aside. 
The Constitutional Court recently reiterated this position in Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly as well as 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly (Economic 
Freedom Fighters) case.52 In the judgment, the Constitutional Court 
                                            
48 DA v SABC paras 49-63.  
49  SABC v DA para 45.  
50  Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 26.  
51  Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 45.  
52  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance 
v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) (Economic Freedom 
Fighters). The case arose from the Public Protector's report on the upgrade of the 
President's home in Nkandla. The Public Protector found that several improvements 
were non-security features and concluded that the President and his family were 
unduly enriched as a result of the non-security features. She then took remedial action 
against the President by enjoining him inter alia to take steps with the assistance of 
the National Treasury and the South African Police Services to determine the 
reasonable cost of the measures not related to security and the President to pay a 
reasonable percentage of such cost. In the meantime, after the President had 
submitted his response to the National Assembly, the latter set up two ad hoc 
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concurred with the SCA's view that the Public Protector's remedial action 
had a binding effect.53 To this effect, the Constitutional Court held that when 
remedial action is binding, compliance is not optional and that remedial 
action taken against those under investigation cannot be ignored without 
any legal consequences.54 
It is, therefore, not open to anyone to ignore the Public Protector's remedial 
action based on holding a different view or to choose which part(s) of the 
remedial action to implement.55 Doing so would be contrary to the rule of 
law, that requires that law-abiding people obey decisions made by those 
clothed with legal authority to make such laws or to approach a court for the 
setting aside of such decisions.56 This is why the Constitutional Court, 
contrary to the SCA, was vehemently critical of the use of parallel 
investigations and processes in order to assess the veracity of the findings 
and recommendations of the Public Protector.57 It stated in no uncertain 
terms that the National Assembly was wrong in passing a resolution that 
nullified the Public Protector's remedial actions.58 According to the court, 
there is nothing wrong in seeking to ascertain the veracity of the finding of 
the Public Protector, but the court made it clear that the National Assembly 
actually flouted its obligations by passing a resolution nullifying the Public 
Protector's findings and replacing them with its own findings, because the 
Public Protector's remedial actions are binding until set aside through a 
proper judicial process.59 
From the above it emerges that unlike ombudsmen in other jurisdictions, the 
Public Protector is established on a solid foundation that guarantees its 
independence so as to enable it to carry out its functions impartially. In so 
doing, the Public Protector may hold government accountable on various 
                                            
committees comprising of its members to examine the Public Protector's report, as 
well as other reports, including the one compiled the Minister of Police. After endorsing 
the report by the Minister exonerating the President from any liability and a report to 
the same effect by its last ad hoc committee, the National Assembly resolved to 
absolve the President of all liability. Consequently, the President did not comply with 
the remedial action taken by the Public Protector. This prompted the Economic 
Freedom Fighters to seek clarity on the binding effect of the Public Protector's 
remedial action. 
53  Economic Freedom Fighters para 73.  
54  Economic Freedom Fighters para 73.  
55  Economic Freedom Fighters para 75. 
56  Economic Freedom Fighters para 75. 
57  Economic Freedom Fighters para 47.  
58  Economic Freedom Fighters para 98. 
59  Economic Freedom Fighters para 99.  
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service delivery issues such as the progressive realisation of the right to 
housing. 
2.3 The accountability functions of the Public Protector in the 
progressive realisation of the right to housing 
The classical function of all ombudsmen is to investigate complaints by 
citizens concerning the administrative actions of the state. The primary 
functions of the ombudsman are to receive complaints from aggrieved 
citizens against government officials or agencies, investigate them, where 
necessary recommend corrective measures in order to remedy the 
grievances, and issue reports. The Public Protector is provided with similar 
powers to investigate inter alia any maladministration or undue delay in 
state affairs on its own initiative or on receipt of a complaint or an allegation 
or on the grounds of information that has come to its knowledge.60 The 
accounting role of the Public Protector towards the government is exercised 
through its functions as set out in section 182(1) of the Constitution as 
follows: 
The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation, (a) 
to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any 
sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result 
in any impropriety or prejudice; (b) to report on that conduct; and (c) to take 
appropriate remedial action. 
In the light of the provision of section 182 above, the Public Protector is 
constitutionally mandated to investigate and report any maladministration 
on the part of the government and to take any remedial action it deems 
appropriate. The power of the Public Protector is also provided for in 
sections 6, 7 and 7A of the Public Protector Act,61 which give the Public 
Protector additional rights, among others to subpoena, enter premises and 
exercise seizure. Matters which fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the 
Public Protector are provided for in section 6(4)(a)(i)-(v) of the Public 
Protector Act. That section mandates the Public Protector to investigate the 
following improper conducts: any abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power 
or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay 
by a person performing a public function; any improper or dishonest act or 
omission; any improper or unlawful enrichment or receipt of any improper 
advantage, or promise of such enrichment or advantage, by a person as a 
result of an act or omission in the public administration or in connection with 
the affairs of government at any level or of a person performing a public 
                                            
60 Section 7 of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
61 Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
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function; or any act or omission by a government employee at any level, or 
a person performing a public function, which results in unlawful or improper 
prejudice to any other person. 
It is clear that the Public Protector may investigate any improper act or 
omission in the running of state affairs on its own initiative or on receipt of a 
complaint. With regard to an investigation arising from its own initiative, for 
instance, it is reported in the Public Protector 2009-2010 Annual Report that 
the Public Protector conducted three investigations relating to the alleged 
undue delay on the part of the Western Cape Education Department to 
attend to conditions at Duneside Primary School; the allegations from a 
newspaper that the North-West Department of Transport, Roads and 
Community Safety failed to pay Mr K for providing transportation to learners 
of Calvyn Primary School; and a report by the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation regarding an incident where a trench was dug for the purpose 
of constructing a storm-water pipeline in Block 17, Moloto village, but was 
allegedly left unfilled by Thembisile Local Municipality.62 Three 
investigations initiated by the Office of the Public Protector were also 
reported in the 2010-2011 Annual Report.63 It is in the exercise of its 
functions that the Public Protector could hold accountable the government 
in the realisation of the right to housing. For the Public Protector to be able 
to hold government accountable for its omission or act in relation to the right 
to housing, there first needs to be a complaint about either the violation or 
the promotion of the right to housing. It is the receipt of a complaint, or an 
investigation by the Public Protector on its own volition, that triggers the 
accounting role of the Public Protector, which is investigating, reporting and 
taking appropriate measures to cease the violation or to promote the 
realisation of a right. It is expected that the investigation should be proper. 
Meetings with affected complainant/s and/or community members may be 
held, interviews with responsible government officials and visits/inspections 
in loco may be carried out to assess the validity of the allegation/s. Once 
the investigation is completed, the Public Protector should report on the 
alleged improper act/omission. The reporting power of the Public Protector 
takes the form of a finding as to the veracity of the alleged act or omission. 
These findings would be the outcome of the investigations to establish the 
veracity of the complaints or allegations. The findings would be incorporated 
into the report and form the third phase of that report. 
                                            
62 Public Protector Annual Report 2009-2010 38-41. 
63  Public Protector Annual Report 2010-2011 7. 
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The power to investigate would be meaningless without any remedial 
power. The remedial power enables the Public Protector to take corrective 
measures that redress the act or omission by making recommendations to 
that effect.64 To this end, the Public Protector is enjoined in section 182(1)(c) 
of the Constitution to take appropriate remedial action to solve the issue 
under investigation. This remedial action is incorporated into the report of 
the investigation. The remedy granted by the Public Protector takes the form 
of recommendations aimed at resolving alleged improper conduct in the 
light of the findings.65 These recommendations generally refer the matter to 
the appropriate public body, which would take the steps necessary to 
address the issue.66 These three core functions of the Public Protector are 
illustrated below in the light of its reports. 
2.4 The Public Protector and the investigation of the right to housing 
Before examining investigations relating to the right to housing, it is worth 
noting that section 6(4)(b)(i)-(iii) of the Public Protector Act enjoins the 
Public Protector to endeavour in its sole discretion to resolve any dispute or 
rectify any act or omission through mediation, conciliation or negotiation as 
well as expressing an advisory opinion or any process that may be 
expedient in the circumstances. In this respect the Public Protector has 
established the Early Resolution Unit to resolve speedily any complaint 
received. In its 2009-2010 Annual Report, the Public Protector credited itself 
that many complaints and disputes regarding state maladministration and 
other forms of improper conduct and related prejudice or injustice were 
resolved through conciliation, mediation and negotiation, which contributed 
to expediting and finalising investigations, cases and the delivery of 
remedial action in appropriate circumstances.67 The use of mediation, 
conciliation and negotiation resulted in the early resolution of some of the 
cases brought, and granted speedy redress to some victims of 
maladministration and other forms of improper conduct by state actors.68 
                                            
64  Section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
65  Section 8 of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994.  
66 Bishop and Woolman "Public Protector" 24A-16. 
67 Public Protector's Annual Report 2009-2010. 
68  In the 2013-2014 annual report, the Public Protector reported that it received 
complaints regarding allegations of maladministration of RDP housing (incomplete 
and defective) in Mpumalanga. The Public Protector visited the affected communities, 
took photographs of the houses and forwarded them to the Provincial Department of 
Human Settlement. A memorandum of understanding was entered into between the 
Public Protector and the Department which undertook to repair a total of 401 houses. 
An action plan monitored by the Public Protector was put in place indicating the 
different timelines for implementation (59).  
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This is consonant with the general aim of mediation, which is to encourage 
contending parties to settle their dispute.69 Mediation and conciliation are 
conducted under the auspices of a third party whose role is to facilitate the 
consent of the parties. Unlike in adjudication proceedings where the third 
party involved imposes a solution upon the litigants and does not require 
consent,70 most people prefer mediation because the parties control the 
dispute and its resolution.71 Mediation improves communication between 
parties, thereby enhancing harmonious relationships which may have 
deadlocked in a formal adjudication process. In this sense, mediation and 
or conciliation boosts parties' confidence, resulting in a speedy resolution of 
a dispute. In addition, a mediator or a conciliator can encourage parties to 
think about the relative costs and advantages of choosing one or another 
course of action.72 Moreover, mediation may be used as a supplement to 
having recourse to the courts.73 
Despite the benefits attributed to conciliation and/or mediation, these 
processes do not often yield the expected result. Hence litigation has been 
known to ensue thereafter, or investigations have had to be performed in 
the case of the Public Protector. Although the Public Protector received a 
number of complaints, few of such complaints relate to the right to housing. 
Four complaints variously related to housing are examined below. 
2.4.1 Complaint relating to poor service delivery against Senqu Local 
Municipality 
This complaint lodged against the Senqu Local Municipality in the Eastern 
Cape relates to allegations of poor service delivery to residents of New 
Location and Khwezi Townships in Lady Grey, and to the communities of 
Walaza, Khasalala, Mfityi, Ndofela, Mbhobho and Hinana villages in 
Sterkspruit. Residents complained about the lack of a water supply, 
sanitation, road maintenance and electricity, among other issues. 
This complaint is the subject of an investigative report numbered 34 of 
2010/11. After investigations into the veracity of the complaint, the Public 
Protector found that the communities indeed had problems regarding the 
delivery of services by the municipality and that there was inadequate 
sanitation infrastructure in all the affected villages, which posed a health risk 
                                            
69  McEwen and Maiman 1984 Law & Soc'y Rev 12.  
70  McEwen and Maiman 1984 Law & Soc'y Rev 15. 
71  McEwen and Maiman 1984 Law & Soc'y Rev 45. 
72  McEwen and Maiman 1984 Law & Soc'y Rev 15. 
73  See Bryant and Lane 2013 Franchise LJ 261-277.  
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to the community. Also, it was found that the road infrastructure needed 
improvement and upgrading as this posed a challenge to the community, 
particularly during rainy seasons.74  
Having found that there was inadequate service delivery in the areas, the 
Public Protector made recommendations to the effect that the Municipal 
Managers concerned should take steps to ensure that municipal services 
are rendered in compliance with the Batho Pele principles; to fast-track the 
implementation of water and sanitation projects; to provide interim relief for 
the provision of water; to attend to the upgrading of roads; to explore options 
to make land available for low-cost housing projects; and to implement 
systems to deal with the capturing and processing of applications for low-
cost housing. 
2.4.2 Complaint against the failure of Steve Tshwete Local Municipality to 
assist with the acquisition of a title deed75 
The complaint against the Steve Tshwete Local Municipality arose out of 
two complaints lodged by Mr PA Phoku and Mr MJ Mthembu. Both 
complainants alleged that they were allocated low-cost subsidy houses 
(stand No 4292 and stand No 2876 located in Extensions 6 and 4 
respectively). Both complainants alleged that since they had been allocated 
their houses they had unsuccessfully approached the Municipality for their 
title deeds. In the case of Mr Mthembu, however, it was alleged that another 
person had already registered his stand in his name. 
As part of its investigation into the complaints, the Public Protector held 
meetings and exchanged correspondence with municipal officials. About Mr 
Phoku's complaint, the Public Protector sent a written enquiry to the 
Municipal Chief Housing Officer, and when he failed to respond, it followed 
this up with letters and telephonic calls to the Chief Housing Officer. This 
led to a response (although almost six months later) by Ms FE Phiri, the 
Municipal Executive Manager of Public Services, to the effect that Mr 
Phoku's name was on the list that had been forwarded to the service 
provider, Sisonke Development Planner, appointed to register housing 
beneficiaries in Kwazamokuhle Extension 6. 
                                            
74 Public Protector's Annual Report 2010-2011 12. The examination into this complaint 
is limited to what was incorporated into the final report due to the difficulty in obtaining 
the report from the Public Protector's office.  
75  The findings about this complaint are embodied in report No 3 of 2010/11 dated 14 
June 2010.  
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Regarding Mr Mthembu's case, in a letter dated 6 May 2008 Ms Phiri 
explained that there had been a misallocation of houses by the service 
provider (Grinaker Ltd and the Birman & Serfontein Attorneys). She also 
stated that although the attorneys had advised the Municipality that all of 
the beneficiaries involved should visit their offices to resolve the problem, 
the process did not proceed due to a lack of cooperation by one of the 
affected beneficiaries. 
Subsequent to this letter, and to speed up the investigation, the Public 
Protector held a meeting with Ms Phiri on 13 August 2008 to clarify the 
report received from the Municipality. It appeared in the case of Mr Phoku 
that the service provider had failed to discharge the mandate to register the 
title deeds not only of Mr Phoku but of all other beneficiaries of low-cost 
subsidy houses residing in Kwazamokuhle Extension 6. Concerning the 
case of Mr Mthembu, all parties agreed that the cases of all of the 
beneficiaries whose houses were incorrectly registered in somebody else's 
name in Kwazamokuhle Extension 4 be tabled at a Mayoral Committee 
scheduled for 14 August 2008. After Mr Andries Masilela had failed to 
convey the resolution of the Mayoral Committee to the Public Protector, Ms 
Phiri sent another letter to the Public Protector reiterating that they had held 
a meeting with the affected beneficiaries and that they had sent 
recommendations to the council for consideration. The Mayoral Committee 
meeting, which took place on 20 November 2008, considered the 
recommendations received from Ms Phiri. The Mayoral Committee adopted 
the recommendations, and Mr Masilela sent the resolutions to the Public 
Protector. The Municipality decided, among other things, that the affected 
beneficiaries in Kawzamokuhle Extension 4 should remain in the houses 
they were occupying and that it would instruct at its own costs its attorneys 
to immediately rectify the error concerning the title deeds of houses whose 
accounts were up-to-date. 
Subsequent to the investigation, the Public Protector found that the Steve 
Tshwete Local Municipality had failed to assist Mr Phoku timeously in 
acquiring a title deed for his stand and to address the Department of Local 
Government and Housing on the issue of stands that had been incorrectly 
allocated in Kwazamokuhle extension 4. The Public Protector then 
recommended that the Municipal Manager take steps to attend to the 
registration of Mr Phoku's title deed and implement the resolution of the 
Mayoral Committee of 20 November 2008. The Public Protector also 
recommended that the Municipal Manager should ensure that the 
beneficiaries of low-cost subsidy houses shold get assistance to obtain title 
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deeds for their properties within a reasonable time after taking lawful 
occupation.  
2.4.3 Complaint against the City of Tshwane relating to its failure to 
implement an undertaking to transfer a property to Mr and Mrs 
Zondi76 
In this matter Mr and Mrs Zondi, the complainants, alleged that they had 
purchased a property marked Erf 11521 from the Municipality at the cost of 
R17 286.45. During 2004 the complainants found that a structure had been 
erected on property occupied by someone else. The occupier alleged 
having bought the stand from the Municipality. After a complaint was lodged 
with the Municipality, the complainants alleged that the Municipality 
confirmed that a councillor had sold the stand without prior consultation and 
authorisation. The Municipality is alleged to have undertaken to compensate 
the complainants with another stand and to install basic services on the 
stand but did not fulfil its undertaking. 
In investigating the complaint, the Public Protector corresponded with 
officials of the Municipality and held meetings with the General Manager, 
Housing, and the Deputy Director: Development Law, Alienation and 
Acquisition services. A letter dated 28 July 2004 was sent to the Municipality 
requesting information and documentation regarding the complaint. In 
response, and in a letter dated 4 August 2004, Mr FM Fenyane of the 
Informal Settlement, Land Invasion Management and Community Liaison 
Department confirmed that the complainants had indeed purchased the 
queried stand and that the stand had been allocated to a third party. 
The Municipality then resolved to provide an alternative property in the 
same area and to sell the subject property to the occupant on the basis that 
the latter had already erected a structure on it. Subsequent to this letter, the 
Public Protector held a meeting with Municipal officials in December 2004. 
The officials reported that they had referred the matter to the Municipality's 
Legal Department for finalisation, that the Municipality had allocated an 
alternative property, portion 2 of stand 9684, Mamelodi East, to the 
complainants, and that the process of installing services on the alternative 
property was underway. This process did not, however, materialise because 
the Municipality later discovered that the alternative property had been 
registered in the name of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (the Church) 
and could therefore not be registered in the complainants'' name. However, 
                                            
76  This complaint is the subject of Report No 2 of 2010/11. 
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the Church moved to another stand, and the complainants were allocated 
the alternative property. The Public Protector made a further enquiry about 
the reasons why the alternative property had not been registered, and why 
water and electricity had not been installed. The Municipality responded in 
a letter dated 17 June 2008 stating that it had reached an agreement with 
the Church that the alternative property be transferred back to the 
Municipality to enable the Municipality to transfer it to the complainants. 
At the end of its investigation, the Public Protector found that the 
Municipality had allocated the complainants' stand to a third party, and it 
had failed for 10 years to honour its undertaking to facilitate the transfer of 
the alternative property to the complainants as compensation for the 
property paid by the complainants. To ensure that the alternative property 
be transferred to the complainants, the Public Protector requested the City 
Manager of the Municipality to compensate the complainants for any loss 
suffered and ensure that within 180 days, Portion 2 of Erf 9684 situated in 
Mamelodi East be transferred to them. In the alternative, it requested the 
Municipality to provide them with a property of equivalent value. It further 
recommended that the City Manager should institute internal proceedings 
to establish the causes of the failures, identify the persons responsible, and 
take further action in terms of the Public Finance Management Act77  
2.4.4 Alleged omission to provide low-cost housing by the Northern Cape 
Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and 
Traditional Affairs78 
In this complaint the Public Protector was requested to investigate 
allegations of maladministration and improper prejudice relating to an 
omission by the Northern Cape Department of Cooperative Governance, 
Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs (the Department) to provide a low-
cost housing subsidy. Mr MJ Dikolomela, the main complainant and his wife, 
Mrs DJ Notywala, (hereafter the complainants), alleged that during February 
2009 they jointly applied for a low-cost subsidy house. However, they were 
informed that their application was unsuccessful because it appeared from 
the Housing Subsidy System (HSS) that Mr Dikolomela was already a 
recipient of a People's Housing Process subsidy, commonly known as the 
Self-Help Housing Subsidy, in Limpopo Province, Lulekani Township. They 
further alleged that the Department allocated their site, number 1068, which 
                                            
77  1 of 1999 
78  The finding of this complaint is titled "Without a Roof" and appears in report 14 of 
2013/2014.  
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they had occupied for more than five years, to the next person on the waiting 
list. 
In order to consider the complainants' allegation the Public Protector 
requested a printout from the HSS database. The HSS database evinced 
that the site occupied by the complainants was registered in the name of Mr 
B C Mahlane. Upon consultation with the complainants on 2 July 2010, they 
requested an urgent intervention. To this effect, on 27 July 2010 an email 
raising the matter was sent to Mr M Mdunge, Senior Manager, Frances 
Baard Regional Office of the Department, requesting the Department to put 
in abeyance the allocation process until the finalisation of its investigation. 
On 29 July 2010 the matter was further discussed telephonically with Ms J 
Moloto of the Department of Local Government and Housing in Limpopo 
and Mr P Komamo of the Department. Ms Moloto consulted the Limpopo's 
HSS database and found that the particulars of Mr Dikolomela did not 
appear on their system. She advised that if Mr Dikolomela had previously 
benefited from a low-cost property in any province in the country, the HSS 
database would detect it. She found that six digits of Mr Dikolomela's identity 
number (ID) matched those of another person' who had previously benefited 
from the housing scheme. According to her, this might have been the reason 
why the complainants' application was unsuccessful. 
Through a correspondence dated 23 September 2010, the matter was 
raised once more with the Acting Head of the Department, Mr Swartland, 
wherein he was advised about the steps taken so far to resolve the matter. 
He was also requested to put the allocation of the house on hold until the 
finalisation of the matter. On 30 September 2010, and in response to an e-
mail sent on the 13th of the same month, Ms Moloto phoned the Public 
Protector advising that they had visited the purported house no 1332 
allocated to Mr Dikolomela, as it was the only house on the HSS database 
owned by someone who had an ID with six digits similar to those of Mr 
Dokolomela. She confirmed that the house had been registered on 4 July 
1997 in Mr B Mahlane's name and also that Mr B Mahlane and Mr 
Dikolomela's months of birth, date of birth and first two ID digits were similar. 
Based on this confirmation, the Public Protector wrote to the Department's 
Regional Manager, Ms Mogodi and Mr Mfeya, Sol Plaatje Municipality 
Housing Manager, on 6 July 2011, proposing a joint meeting to resolve the 
matter through the Alternative Resolution Dispute (ADR) process. The ADR 
meeting took place, and all parties reached an in-principle agreement. They 
agreed that since Mr Dikolomela had been the first to apply for the house, 
the house should have been allocated to him. They could not, however, 
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implement the agreement since the Department had in 2011 approved Mr 
Dikolomela's application for the same house, but the National Department 
of Human Settlements (the National Department) had revoked their decision 
because the Department no longer had the power of deletion on the HSS 
database. Nevertheless, they identified site number 23929, Homelite, 
Kimberly as an alternative site to be allocated to Mr Dikolomela. After the 
identification, an inspection in loco was conducted with the complainants on 
the new site. They were advised, however that the construction of the house 
would commence only once the National Department had performed the 
override or the deletion. 
On 12 November 2010, a meeting was held with the Executive Manager of 
the Department, Ms Soodeyal, and on 13 July 2011 a joint meeting took 
place with Ms Soodeyal and the Manager of the Frances Baard District 
Municipality, Ms Mogodi. It was agreed during the meetings that the 
Department should proceed with the overriding or deletion process which 
would allow Mr Dikolomela to qualify for low-cost housing. On 2 July 2013 
the Department confirmed telephonically that a verification process would 
be carried out on the HSS database. 
Subsequent to this investigation, the Public Protector found that the 
Department had acted wrongfully in concluding that Mr Dikolomela had 
previously benefitted from a low-cost house and then continued to consider 
the next person on the waiting list, and that the Department's action and 
omission to verify the outcome of the HSS constituted maladministration. 
The action of the Department was found to have prejudiced Mr Dikolomela 
and his wife in that they had to continue staying in a shack as a result of the 
error. The Public Protector also found that although certain acts and 
omissions amounted to maladministration, the Department had taken steps 
to rectify the maladministration by allocating an alternative site where Mr 
Dikolomela could build a house. It lastly found that there had been no 
rectification of the erroneous statement that indicated that Mr Dikolomela 
was already the recipient of a housing subsidy. 
In the light of its findings, the Public Protector directed the Director-General 
of the National Department to ensure that Mr Dikolomela be assisted with 
the overriding or deletion process within one month from the date of the 
report to link Mr Dikolomela's application to site number 23929, Homelite, 
Kimberly. The Department was directed to make funds available for the 
construction of the house within one month from the date of the deletion or 
overriding process, and to ensure that construction commenced at the same 
time as funds were made available. The Department was also requested to 
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avoid future errors and first to review the HSS results before considering 
applications for low-cost subsidies and to send a letter of apology to the 
complainants. 
It is evident from the above that the Public Protector has the power to 
investigate, report and take appropriate remedial action or resolve disputes 
through mediation, negotiation or conciliation. The Public Protector 
exercises its mandate to hold public officials accountable through its 
functions. The Public Protector's investigative role into maladministration in 
the provision of services enables it to expose officials or organs of state who 
fail to provide services, thereby holding them accountable for their actions. 
By directing the government to provide services or to cease the violation of 
the right to housing, the Public Protector exercises its accounting powers 
towards the government and organs of state. These accounting powers find 
expression not only in the Public Protector's investigation but also in its 
remedial action. Concerning the role played by the Public Protector in 
holding government accountable during its investigation, this paper submits 
that government accounts to the Public Protector when it engages with the 
Public Protector during the investigation. It is because of the recognition of 
the accounting role of the Public Protector in enforcing the realisation of the 
right to housing that various government entities correspond and hold 
meetings with the Public Protector to justify their actions and or omissions. 
The Provincial Department of Human Settlement in Mpumalanga even 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Public Protector79 in order 
to avoid unnecessary investigations. In so doing the Department does not 
only acknowledge the need to account to the Public Protector but also 
acknowledged the role of the Public Protector as a vector of accountability 
enshrined in the Constitution. Moreover, the undertaking to provide 
alternative stands in two of the above cases demonstrates that the role 
played by the Public Protector in enforcing the right to housing cannot be 
disputed. The Public Protector's remedial actions also reinforce its 
accounting role. 
Concerning the Public Protector's remedial action, it is argued in this paper 
that notwithstanding the binding effect of the remedial action, it determines 
                                            
79  Public Protector Annual Report 2013/14, 57. The agreement was entered into to solve 
numerous complaints regarding allegations of maladministration in respect of RDP 
houses in Mpumalanga. Most of the complaints related to incomplete and defective 
houses. As part of the agreement, the department undertook to repair 401 houses. An 
action plan was put together to indicate the different timelines of implementation. The 
Public Protector continues to monitor the implementation. 
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the extent to which the Public Protector may hold government accountable. 
The accounting function of the Public Protector is in turn dependent on 
government's compliance with the remedial action. This means that the 
Public Protector's role in holding government accountable depends to a 
large extent on whether its remedial actions have been complied with. This 
is so because remedial actions are not always fully implemented.80 It, would 
be however, presumptive to generalise about the implementation or non-
implementation of the remedial actions as only an examination of the 
remedial actions in the four reports above may determine the extent of the 
Public Protector's role as an accounting institution as far as the right to 
housing is concerned.81 
In Report 14 of 2013/2014 examined above, the Public Protector directed 
the Department to effect five actions to rectify its omission to provide a low-
cost housing subsidy to Mr Dikolomela. It is reported that the Department 
has complied with four of the remedial actions.82 Concerning the non-
implementation of the remedial action relating to the inclusion of the 
complainant's name on a list of beneficiaries, it is reported that Sol Plaatje 
Municipality undertook to finalise the provision of the house of the 
complainant before the end of December 2014. However, this had not yet 
been done as at the receipt of the compliance report on 13 October 2015. 
This signifies that there has been almost full compliance with the Public 
Protector's remedial action. By complying with four of the remedial actions 
and by undertaking to include the complainant's name on the list of 
beneficiaries, the Department was accounting to the Public Protector. The 
compliance report above demonstrates that the Public Protector, as an 
accounting institution established to support elected institutions, through its 
findings and remedial actions ensures that government carries out its 
constitutional mandate of providing sustainable services to its communities, 
thereby rendering government accountable not only to it but also to 
communities. The Public Protector's accounting functions are even greater 
when government complies with the Public Protector's remedial actions. 
Compliance with the Public Protector's remedial action enhances its 
accounting role in enforcing the realisation of the right to housing. By holding 
government accountable through its remedial actions, the Public Protector 
ensures that its' role is consonant with the purpose of political accountability, 
                                            
80  There are instances where the government has not implemented the Public 
Protector's remedial actions, the DA v SABC case being one such instance.  
81  It is worth noting that the author could obtain only one compliance report from the 
Public Protector, despite making numerous written requests since September 2015.  
82  Compliance report received from the Public Protector's office. Document with author.  
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which is to hold accountable, government and or organs of state for their 
actions and or omission.83 
It follows that since the purpose of political accountability is to hold public 
officials accountable, the Public Protector, as one of its mechanisms, also 
fulfils the same purpose. This paper, therefore, posits that there is no need 
to focus solely on courts in seeking to enforce the realisation of the right to 
housing. The Public Protector is another avenue or forum through which 
one can enforce the realisation of the right to housing. With almost full 
compliance with the Public Protector's remedial actions by the government, 
the enforcement of the right to housing may be done through the Public 
Protector. Moreover, and in accordance with the findings in the cases 
involving the SABC and the Economic Freedom Fighters, the government 
should comply with the Public Protector's remedial actions until they are 
reviewed and set aside. Until such time that these remedial actions are 
reviewed, they stand and should be complied with. This is because the 
Public Protector is considered as an institution whose decisions, even if 
unreasonable, are binding until set aside on review. 
In the event that the government does not comply with the remedial actions 
and has not set them aside on review, the paper suggests that the remedial 
actions be made an order of court. Any aggrieved party or even the Public 
Protector may apply to the court for the remedial actions to be made an 
order of court. To this end, the constitutional provisions and the legislation 
relating to the Public Protector should be amended to reflect this suggestion. 
This in clear entails including in section 182(1)(c) and section 6(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 that the Public Protector's remedial 
actions may be made an order of court if not complied with. 
The amendment to the above sections to the effect that the Public 
Protector's remedial actions be made orders of court would strengthen the 
accounting power of the Public Protector. Court's judgments have more 
weight than remedial actions and making them orders of court would 
definitely enhance the Public Protector's remedial powers. This is because 
orders of court, by virtue of section 165(5) of the Constitution, bind all 
persons. Since remedial actions made orders of court are binding 
                                            
83  It would be presumptuous of the author to discuss the factors taken into account by 
the Public Protector in conducting its own initiative investigation. Perhaps one may 
venture to say that the Public Protector does not prioritise housing issues despite the 
existence of the wide-spread housing crisis because due to the wide scope of its 
functions the Public Protector cannot solely investigate housing issues. 
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documents, they have the force of law and can be enforced through the 
legal process. 
This paper therefore argues that the Public Protector is an institution that 
may be used to enforce the right to housing. However, it should not be seen 
as an alternative dispute resolution institution operating parallel to courts 
but as an institution that complements the role played by courts in the 
enforcement of the right to housing. The Public Protector is therefore the 
most invaluable constitutional gift in the fight against corruption, unlawful 
enrichment, prejudice and impropriety in State affairs, and for the 
betterment of good governance,84 which is the only guarantee that citizens 
may enjoy the benefits associated with the attainment of democracy.85 
The paper also submits that unlike the courts, which are constrained by the 
separation of powers, the Public Protector is not a sphere of government 
which should be concerned with the separation of powers. It should be 
emphasised that because the adjudication of socio-economic rights in 
general gives rise to positive entitlement, it is argued that the courts do not 
have the institutional and technical capacity to deal with these rights. It is 
further argued that the courts do not have the legitimacy to question the 
policy decision-making of elected representatives and that the involvement 
of the courts in such cases would result in a violation of the separation of 
powers. This is because socio-economic rights litigation often has a policy 
and budgetary implication.86 Unlike the courts, the Public Protector has the 
necessary expertise to investigate complex policy or technical issues and to 
issue remedial actions. To this end, the Public Protector may employ 
professionals across any fields of expertise to carry out its duties. In the 
event, if the Public Protector lacks the human resources to engage in a 
particular investigation, it may well outsource the investigation. 
It is submitted that a lack of institutional and technical capacity do not affect 
the functions of the Public Protector. The Public Protector is free from any 
constraints and exercises its function impartially and without fear or favour. 
This is so because the concern about trespassing on the domain of other 
spheres of government does not apply to it. Indeed, the Public Protector is 
constitutionally established to investigate any maladministration and to hold 
accountable anyone found to have failed to carry out his/her duties 
according to the prescripts. Therefore, any alleged maladministration is 
                                            
84  Economic Freedom Fighters para 52.  
85  De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law 264. 
86  Nolan, Porter and Langford 2009 CHRGJ Working Paper 13; Brennan 2009 QUTLJJ 
72.  
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sufficient to trigger the Public Protector's investigating and holding 
accountable the faulty party, regardless of the spheres of government in 
which the incident occurred. 
The paper further submits that it would be beneficial to enforce the right to 
housing through the Public Protector because it is cost effective to do so. It 
is common cause that court proceedings are usually expensive, and having 
an institution through which one may enforce the same right free of charge 
is a welcome addition to the legal route.87 Moreover, because housing-
related complainants are often indigent and cannot afford legal costs, the 
Public Protector appears as a panacea, because it only requires the lodging 
of a complaint for the Public Protector to commence investigations. As 
clearly articulated by the Chief Justice in Economic Freedom Fighters, the 
Public Protector is the constitutional instrument that gives "the poor and 
marginalised a voice, and teeth that would bite corruption and abuse 
excruciatingly".88 The Public Protector "is the embodiment of a Biblical 
David who fought the most powerful and very well resourced Goliath, that 
impropriety and corruption by government officials are".89 The Public 
Protector is, therefore, another available constitutional option through which 
the marginalised and poor may exercise their right to housing. It is through 
the Public Protector that the voiceless may hear their voices penetrate the 
deafness of a dysfunctional bureaucracy and may receive justice, which has 
become an increasingly rare gift. The Public Protector is in a position to 
assist underprivileged people to realise and enforce their right to housing to 
a certain extent, and may thus complement the excellent role played by the 
judiciary. It is an institution which fulfils its role as a mechanism of political 
accountability. In addition, in order to be cost effective, the enforcement of 
the right to housing through the Public Protector will go a long way to easing 
the backlog in the courts where litigants may have to wait for a long time for 
their matters to be adjudicated.90 It then follows that by electing to pursue 
                                            
87  In Economic Freedom Fighters, it was held that the tentacles of poverty run far, wide 
and deep in our nation and that litigation is prohibitively expensive and therefore not 
an easily exercisable constitutional option for an average citizen.  
88  Economic Freedom Fighters para 52. 
89  Economic Freedom Fighters para 52. 
90  The case of Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Limited v Occupiers of Saratoga 
Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) is illustrative of how the prosecution of a matter may be 
delayed. The case number in the matter was issued in 2006. The matter was heard 
only some three years later on 17-18 June 2009 and 22 July 2009. Judgment was 
delivered some six months later on 4 February 2010. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
heard the matter a year later on 18 February 2011 and the Constitutional Court in the 
same year ie 11 August 2011, and in the following year on 30 March 2012. In total, it 
took some six years to reach finality in this matter.  
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the enforcement of their right to housing through the Public Protector, 
complainants would also be vindicated and could receive the right to which 
they are entitled. 
3 Conclusion 
This paper is premised on the broader concept of political accountability, 
which is to hold government accountable for its failure to realise the right to 
housing. It has been argued that the realisation of the right to housing is 
being enforced solely through the courts, which are only one of the existing 
mechanisms of political accountability. It has further been argued that by 
focusing only on courts, other mechanisms of political accountability that 
may play a role in the realisation of the right to housing have been ignored 
and or used only occasionally. This paper has examined the role of the 
Public Protector as a mechanism of political accountability in the realisation 
of the right to housing. To this effect, this paper posits that the Public 
Protector is another avenue through which the realisation of the right to 
housing may be enforced. The role of the Public Protector supplements that 
played by the courts and should not in any way be viewed as a substitute 
for the litigation process or a means of stripping the courts of their 
adjudicative role in enforcing the realisation of the right to housing. The 
paper has argued that because courts as a mechanism of political 
accountability as explored above have some limitations, the Public Protector 
is a welcome addition to the mechanisms for realising the right to housing. 
It should, however, be emphasised that the Public Protector is not an 
alternative but a complement to courts in the realisation of the right to 
housing. The use of the Public Protector as a complementary institution to 
enforce the realisation of the right to housing proves that a non-adjudicative 
method is also useful to enforce that right. Perhaps it may for a future 
purpose not be presumptive to advocate or suggest a policy shift that 
compels housing litigants first to approach the Public Protector and then the 
court only as a last resort. 
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